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Abstract 
Objectives: To investigate whether the provision of dental services is influenced by 
economic incentives in a third-party funded dental service in the Republic of Ireland. 
 Methods: Four treatment items were identified as outcome variables. These items 
were characterised by variation in regulation among administrative regions or 
variation in regulation over time. The items were Extra Oral Radiographs, 
Endodontics, Prolonged Periodontal Treatment, and Surgical Extractions. Claims data 
were obtained from the Primary Care Reimbursement Service (PCRS), formerly 
known as the General Medical Services Payments Board (GMSPB).  Population data 
were obtained from the Central Statistics Office. Data were obtained from the 
Principal Dental Surgeons in Ireland who apply local regulatory or price controls for 
certain items of treatment. The data were analysed to determine the impact of the 
variation in regulatory approach on claims data among the eight regional health 
administrative areas whilst controlling for known clinical or population structural 
factors. Results   There was a substantially lower than average provision of Extra-Oral 
Radiographs in regions where regulation was stringently applied. The provision of 
Prolonged Periodontal Treatment was positively correlated with price. The dentist-to-
population ratio is positively correlated with claims for Surgical Extractions. 
Conclusions There is evidence from within the funding system that economic 
incentives, arising from either the contract itself or due to the geographical structure 
of the dentist workforce in Ireland, leads to variations in certain items of service 
provision which are potentially inefficient and independent of known treatment need.  
 
Keywords: Economic incentives, Regulation, 3rd party payments system, Evidence-
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Introduction 
 
The Dental Treatment Services Scheme (DTSS) is a publicly funded choice of 
dentist scheme (budgeted to cost €63 million in 2010) which in the period under 
review provided basic dental care to less well-off adults (Medical Card Holders) and 
was free of charge to the recipients. In this scheme dental services were delivered by 
private dentists in their own practices and dentists were subsequently remunerated for 
services by the Health Service Executive (HSE) Primary Care Reimbursement Service 
(PCRS).  Incentivisation of patients to “over consume”, and dentists to “over-provide” 
services is a potential risk in such third party funded systems where there is zero 
monetary cost to the patient. Moral hazard is a term used by economists to describe 
the potential change in the attitudes of consumers (consumer moral hazard) and 
providers (provider moral hazard) of health care which results from becoming insured 
against the full costs of such care. Thus, in insurance based health care systems, such 
as the DTSS, there is potential for an inflated demand for and provision of services 
than would be the case in a perfect market with paying consumers.  
 
Moral hazard on the part of dentists occurs for two related reasons.  First, on 
the supply side, a third party (in this case a government agency, the PCRS) pays for 
dental care provided by dentists. With this third party bearing the costs of care, 
dentists have few incentives to moderate the amount of care they supply.  They do not 
bear the costs of their decision-making.  Second, on the demand side there is 
asymmetric information between patients and dentists characterized by an imbalance 
of power whereby the dentists largely determines the level and the amount of services 
required. The patient seeks advice on what services to demand from the very person 
who is supplying the service. Thus, the dentist can both influence demand, and supply 
a service, for which s/he bears little, if any, of the financial burden.  Such a situation 
can lead to overutilization of services (1). This type of provider moral hazard is most 
often associated with systems of payment based on fee-for-service, such as the DTSS, 
where the dentist receives a fee for each item of service performed.  The more 
services provided the more income for the dentist. This phenomenon is also known as 
‘supplier induced demand’ (SID).  
 
The first type of SID effect occurs where an increase in supply of dentists 
paradoxically may lead to an increase in the income of dentists. Normally, an increase 
of suppliers in a competitive market leads to increased competition with a reduction in 
prices charged to the consumer. The SID theory holds that dentists use their position 
as an agent of the patient to inform the patient that they require more treatment than 
would previously have been deemed necessary. Thus the volume of work increases 
and, surprisingly, the prices charged increase as dentists become busier. The question 
of whether this is, in fact, a moral hazard or not depends on whether the extra work 
induced is of benefit to the patient. For example inducing patients to have unnecessary 
check-ups or unwarranted diagnostic tests represents moral hazard, whereas offering 
clinically justified services does not.  
 
A second SID-type effect can occur in a state or insurance system where the 
relative remuneration for different items of treatment varies.  The possibility here is 
that dentists may over- or under-provide treatments based on the payment they 
receive. An increase in the level of payment for a specific item on the scheme 
schedule may lead to a dentist switching their time to preferentially providing that 
item. 
 
While the theory of SID is well developed, the published literature reports 
conflicting findings on the magnitude of the phenomenon.  Birch (2), Grembowski et 
al (3), Porter et al (4), and Chalkley and Tilley (5), suggest evidence of induced 
demand by dentists in specific cases. Evidence also exists in the case of physicians, a 
similar group of professionals, as described by Grytten (6), Izumida et al (7), Delattre 
and Dormont (8), and Xirasagar and Lin (9).  Woods et al (10) found that dentists 
providing oral health services in the DTSS were influenced by both economic 
incentives and system changes. However, in contrast, Sorensen and Grytten (11) and 
Madden et al (12) report a failure to find SID effects in specific medical care 
schemes. 
 
Donaldson and Gerard argue that some ‘overuse’ of service may be warranted, 
implying that some provider moral hazard can be efficient.  The implication is that 
certain types of provider behavior, such as SID, should not be seen as all ‘bad’. There 
are neoclassical economic arguments that suggest that, in at least some cases, 
professional ethical and altruistic motives provide a satisfactory explanation for the 
observed behaviour. De Vany et al (13), Lambert (14), De Jaegher and Jegers (15), 
and Richardson and Peacock (16), provide evidence that an observed extra demand 
may derive from professionals being willing to deliver extra benefits to the 
population, such as the provision of night clinics, domiciliary visits, and improved 
quality of care. In such cases, the observed effect is clearly not a moral hazard.  
 
Methods to control consumer moral hazard in medicine and dentistry tend to be 
ineffective (17, 18, 19, 20). As the supplier in this case holds most of the power in the 
relationship, it is not surprising that efforts to curb moral hazard should concentrate 
on the provider side. The DTSS service provides an opportunity to study the impact of 
design of a third party funded system on claims for payment for service provided and 
evidence of moral hazard. Although the DTSS is a single system it is administered at 
regional level, there being eight administrative regions. Thus simple geographic 
comparisons of the frequency of claims for services where there is no variation in 
payment or in regulations governing the provision of that service is possible, the 
example used is Surgical Extraction. The impact of regional variation in remuneration 
can be explored using comparison of claims for Endodontic Treatment and Prolonged 
Periodontal Treatment as the rates of remuneration varied by region during the 
reference period. Variation in the requirement for justification of extra oral 
radiography among regions allows the study of the impact of regulation. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether economic incentives influence the 
provision of third-party funded dental services within the DTSS in the Republic of 
Ireland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Materials and Methods 
 
Data were obtained from a number of existing sources for secondary analysis. 
Regionally aggregated data for treatment carried out under the DTSS between 2001 
and 2006 were assembled in annual report form by the Primary Care Reimbursement 
Service (PCRS) for the eight administrative regions, the Eastern, Midlands, Mid 
Western, North Eastern, North Western, South Eastern, Southern, and Western. The 
data provided details of claims for payment submitted by private dentists at the 
completion of courses of treatment. The PCRS also publish annual reports for each 
administrative region which include the numbers of contracted dentists, number of 
patients seen, the numbers of each item of treatment provided, and the costs for each 
item of treatment. Data were collected from the published reports from 2002 to 2006 
(21, 22, 23, 24, 25).  
 
Population structures were derived from from the Census reports of 2002 and 2006 
from the Central Statistics Office in Dublin (26, 27). The proportions of the age 
groups in each region were determined. The population profiles were broadly similar 
in terms of the percentage distribution across the age categories. The Eastern region 
had the highest percentage of population aged 16-44 at 62% and the North West the 
lowest at 53%.  The combination of information on the number of contracted dentists 
and the number of eligible adults from data obtained from the annual report of the 
PCRS allowed the estimation of the dentist to population ratio in the service by region 
(Table 1). The Southern region had the highest number of dentists per 10,000 
population and the ratio increased from 15.9 to 17.1 between 2002 and 2006. The 
second highest density of dentists was in the Eastern region with the lowest in the 
North West. 
  
Information on levels of remuneration for treatment provided was obtained at regional 
level from personal correspondence to the author from the Principal Dental Surgeons 
managing the services.  The distribution of practices with orthopantomograph 
machines for extra-oral radiography was obtained from the licensing data held by the 
Radiological Protection Society of Ireland in 2006, communicated personally to the 
author. Four DTSS treatment items were selected for investigation. Surgical 
Extraction, Endodontics, Prolonged Periodontal Treatment and Extra-oral 
Radiographs  
 
Surgical Extraction does not vary in price regionally. It is a treatment of interest as it 
is a direct replacement for another DTSS treatment, Extraction. The definition of a 
Surgical Extraction in the DTSS contract makes it clear that this is a specific surgical 
procedure, not merely a time-consuming or difficult extraction. Surgical Extraction 
attracts a fee of approximately three times that of an ordinary Extraction. The moral 
hazard effect here involves the simple substitution of a claim properly made for 
Extraction by one of Surgical Extraction which results in an overcharging of services 
to the State. 
 
Endodontics, and Prolonged Periodontal Treatment, are treatments of interest as both 
showed a regional variation in price and thus provided a natural experiment on the 
effect of price on claims for treatment. As endodontic treatment can be complex and 
the treatment is operator sensitive and requires irreversible expiration of the pulp, it 
does not lend itself to demand inducement except perhaps as an alternative to 
extraction where the substitution would in many cases be a positive choice favouring 
tooth retention. In contrast, periodontal treatment is a type of service where one might 
expect to see demand-inducement for a number of reasons. Firstly periodontal disease 
is often only diagnosable by a dentist, thus the patient is less likely to demand 
treatment themselves. Secondly, it is a chronic condition where the dentist usually has 
no urgent black-and-white acute treatment decisions to make. In this way it is quite 
unlike endodontic treatment. Finally, probity assurance is difficult. It can be difficult 
to tell whether the treatment has even been carried out.  
 
Extra-oral Radiography is of interest as it is the subject of variation in regulations 
among the regions. Authorities in one of the eight regions, the North Western, 
regulated the provision of extra-oral radiographs formally since 2000 by the 
introduction of a written set of regulations for the prescription of orthopantomographs 
(OPGs), the “OPG Protocol”. Orthopantomographs account for virtually all extra-oral 
radiographs taken in general dental practice in Ireland. 
 
To explore the effect of the structure of the third party funding system on the claiming 
pattern for the four selected items of treatment three approaches were adopted.  
• Where there was no regional variation in remuneration or regulation a simple 
comparison across regions was carried out and regional variation was studied 
and discussed, this approach was adopted for the exploration of surgical 
extraction claims.  
• Where there was regional variation in remuneration the correlation between 
number of claims per dentist and the level of fees by region was analysed 
using linear regression and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. This 
approach was adopted for the exploration of endodontic treatment and 
prolonged periodontal treatment. 
• Where there was regional variation in regulations regarding a treatment, the 
number of claims per dentist for the regulated treatment item in the highly 
regulated region was compared with the less regulated regions. This approach 
was adopted for the exploration of claims for extra-oral radiography. 
 
In each case the impact of the regional dentist to population ratio (dentist density) was 
included as it is a measure of competition in the market. 
 
In each case temporal effects across the regions were also examined because the 
health service appointed 20 examining dentists in April 2006 to peer review in the 
Dental Treatment Services Scheme (DTSS) in the Republic of Ireland. The dentists 
would have anticipated the possibility of direct scrutiny of their work in the months 
preceding these appointments. Prior to this time probity assurance was carried out in a 
much more limited fashion and indirectly through the observation of claim patterns. 
 
Results 
In the case of Surgical Extractions, there was an increase in claims activity between 
2002 and 2005 followed by a fall in 2006. This pattern was not related to any price or 
regulatory mechanism, because the price was fixed and no prior approval is required. 
Dentist density per eligible patient could explain 32% of the variation (r2 = 0.319, 
p<0.001). The decrease in the trend in 2005-2006 may be due to a national probity 
exercise that began in May 2006, whereby practitioners with very high ratios of 
Surgical Extractions were challenged on their claim patterns by the funding agency. 
Individual dentists who had claimed a large proportion of Surgical Extractions to total 
extractions were asked to justify their claim patterns (Table 2). 
 
Endodontic treatment is available in the DTSS for anterior teeth only. As caries in 
incisors and canines is relatively rare, particularly for the 70% of the population 
residing in fluoridated areas, it is unsurprising that the average number of endodontic 
treatments per dentist in a year is quite low. The variation within each region’s time 
trend is small in absolute terms. The variation between regions is also quite small in 
absolute terms, being a difference of approximately 1% of all examinations between 
highest and lowest in each year, and  there is a peak of activity in 2003 (Table 3). 
Endodontic treatment requires prior approval and local price negotiation. The unit 
fees paid in each region were consistently highest in the Midland Region (for instance 
€207.96 in 2006) and lowest in the North Western and Western regions (€156 and 
€147.75 respectively in 2006). The highest fee was of the order of 30% greater than 
the lowest between 2002 and 2006. There was a negative association between 
magnitude of remuneration and level of provision (r = -0.538, p<0.001) and also 
between dentist density and mean number of endodontic treatments per annum per 
dentist (r = -0.759, p < 0.001), suggesting that there were fewer claims per dentist in 
areas where prices were higher and where there were more dentists per head of 
population. There is a notable peak in 2003 in almost all regions. This coincided with 
increased dentist availability due to a withdrawal by contracted dentists from a 
separate State scheme for insured workers. The data do not provide evidence of 
economic moral hazard in relation to the provision of endodontic treatment on the 
DTSS.  
Claims for Prolonged Periodontal Treatment showed considerable variation across the 
regions (Table 4). The regions with the highest and lowest claims, North Western and 
Western, are regions which closely resemble each other geographically and 
demographically. The correlation between the number of claims per dentist and 
dentist density was low and not statistically significant (p = 0.13). There was wide 
variation in the average fee paid per course of treatment in this time period (Table 5). 
There was a positive correlation between the price per course of treatment paid and 
the number of periodontal treatments claimed by dentists (r = +0.561, p<0.001). This 
indicates that price may play a role in determining the output of periodontal treatment, 
explaining approximately 31% of the variation seen (r2 = 0.315). These data suggest 
that moral hazard may exist in regard to claims for periodontal treatment in the DTSS. 
 
The pattern of OPG prescription across the regions from 2002 to 2006 shows that the  
North Western region’s rate of provision of this item is notably less than for the other 
regions. The five-year average is 4%, while the closest comparisons are the Eastern, 
Western and Mid-Western at 12%. The remaining regions average about 14% (Table 
6). These data illustrate the impact of putting protocols in place to ensure appropriate 
use of OPGs. They also indicate that moral hazard may exist with regard to the 
provision of Extra Oral Radiographs in the DTSS. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Before considering issues of induced demand, it is necessary to consider the factors 
which can contribute to an automatic variation in treatment demand in the Irish 
regions. Such factors include personal income, regional demography, and regional 
access to dentists.  
 
Personal income of patients, or ability to afford attendance for treatment, should not 
be factor in determining regional variations because eligibility for DTSS services is 
defined by an income limit, and this income limit is consistent nationally across all 
regions.  
 
The impact of regional variation in the distribution of ethnic groups or immigrant 
groups has not been factored into this analysis as the required data were not available, 
it is unlikely however to account for the differences seen.  Regional demographic 
factors considered were age and gender as treatment needs may vary with age and by 
gender. The most noticeable demographic variations noted were with regards to 
gender, notably a majority female population in the two areas with the largest 
conurbations, Dublin (part of Eastern) and Cork (part of Southern). The Male-Female 
ratio varies from 0.97 in the Eastern region at one extreme, to 1.02 in the Midland. 
Gender balance is very similar in the Mid Western, North Western, South Eastern and 
Western regions. Although there was variation in the age profiles of the Irish 
administrative regions, this was manifestly a difference between the Eastern region 
and the rest, with the Eastern having a higher proportion of younger adults. The 
variations in claim patterns tended to occur among regions with similar age structures 
as well as with the East.  
 
In terms of dentist density, the North Western, Midland and Western are similar in 
having the sparsest dentist to population coverage. There is a multiple of 2.7 dentists 
per patient between the most and least advantaged regions. This is greater than the 
variation for other professionals contracted to the medical card scheme. Within 
dentistry, the Southern and Eastern regions had the highest dentist-to-population ratio 
while the North Western had the lowest. The two dental schools in the state are 
located in the Southern and Eastern Regions, 
 Where Surgical Extraction claims are made as a substitute for ordinary Extraction 
claims, each unit of work commands a significantly higher fee; the Surgical 
Extraction fee is a 2.67 multiple of the fee for a simple Extraction. Rather than 
providing extra and unnecessary treatment, with  a negative impact on patient welfare 
as defined in the SID model, this paper substitution of claim description is a 
“victimless crime” (if one does not count the State as a victim). A dentist may feel 
entitled to claim this fee if an extraction proves to be simply more difficult than the 
norm. The Surgical Extraction requires no prior approval and no local price 
negotiation is involved. Therefore in theory, there should be no reason why Surgical 
Extraction rates should vary among regions, other than, possibly, demographic 
reasons. However, the literature is silent on the relationship between demography and 
the need for surgical extractions. While it might be surmised that an older population 
might have a greater need for extractions, there is no reason to think that the 
proportion requiring the surgical approach should vary. Surprisingly, the difference is 
most marked between the two most similar demographic and dentist-sparse regions 
with the Western region having roughly twice the rate of claims of the North Western. 
The total number of extractions, surgical plus ordinary, is remarkably constant across 
the regions at around 0.44 teeth per person. There is no ready explanation for these 
findings. There is evidence of simple substitution of Surgical Extraction claims for 
Extraction claims in some regions, at almost three times the cost to the State per item 
claimed, suggesting evidence of moral hazard. 
 
In the case of Endodontics, there is no evidence of unwanted economic behaviour. 
The consequences of unnecessary treatment are significant and it seems likely that the 
vast majority of dentists would be inhibited by their professional ethics from 
exploiting any potential agency power to induce this item in the DTSS. In addition, 
the ability of an investigator to demonstrate fraudulent practice is probably greater 
with this treatment item than most others, as it is easy to determine whether a tooth 
has been endodontically treated or nor, and this in itself is an inhibitor to false 
claiming.  
 
In the case of Prolonged Periodontal Treatment, the consequences for the patient of 
induced unnecessary treatment are usually not severe, thus there is not a great deal of 
inhibition to be expected from the dentists’ professional ethics in risking 
overtreatment. Also, treatment need is very subjective, thus differences of opinion 
among dentists are more likely to be present than with other items of treatment. The 
prices paid in the Western area were by far the highest paid in Ireland, and the number 
of treatments provided was also the highest. Minor differences in price between other 
regions produce no clear pattern of effect. This indicates that the price difference 
probably requires a threshold magnitude before it becomes important. For Prolonged 
Periodontal Treatment, there is evidence of increased price inducing increased claims.  
 
Dentists do not receive marginal payments for intra-oral radiographs in the DTSS as 
the Examination fee includes a component for these. Therefore, the taking of an intra-
oral radiograph imposes a cost on the dentist with no financial benefit accruing. By 
contrast, in 2007 a fee of almost €40 was payable for an OPG. There is a financial 
motive to provide more Extra-oral Radiographs in cases where they could be positive-
income substitutes for zero-income treatment items. In the region where dentists had 
to comply with evidence-based regulations regarding the use of OPG radiography, the 
average dentist claimed at about one-third of the rate of dentists elsewhere.   
 
The variation in utilisation of OPGs is not explained by population structures; the 
North West has a very similar population structure to other areas, while having a far 
lower level of OPG provision. Another variable to consider is the regional distribution 
in the availability of OPG machines. Data provided by the Radiological Protection 
Institute of Ireland (RPII) indicated that the number of private dentist practices with 
OPG machines in each region in 2006, the nearest year available for comparison, was 
highest in the South Eastern at 0.36 machines per contractor, with the lowest in the 
Western at 0.19 and North Western at 2.0. The distribution of OPG machines does not 
provide an explanation for the frequency of OPGs per examination (r = +0.02). While 
it might appear that perhaps 22% of the variation can be explained by dentist densities 
(r2 = 0.223, p<0.001), this seems to be an artefact due to the North West’s extreme 
low dentist density and its extreme low OPG utilisation; if the North Western area is 
excluded from the analysis, there is no relation at all (r2 = 0.001). By a process of 
elimination, only one variable can satisfactorily explain the observed behaviour, and 
that is the existence of extra regulation in the North Western area due to the utilisation 
of its OPG Protocol. This finding suggests evidence of moral hazard. 
Conclusion 
 
There is evidence to suggest an oversupply of extra oral radiographs compared with 
that which would be provided were an evidence based OPG protocol adhered to. 
These data suggest that that the implementation of protocols provide an effective 
means of are ensuring that all OPGs taken by contractors can be justified.  
Considering the radiation dose delivered by an OPG, the use of such protocols by 
third party funding agencies would appear indicated.   
 
There is a positive relationship between fee level and volume of claims for prolonged 
periodontal treatment. However, there may be a threshold difference at which price 
becomes important. Minor price differences are not associated with  higher claim 
rates. 
  
The regional and temporal variation in claim patterns appear to indicate that dentist 
density is positively related to the rate of claim for fees for Surgical Extractions, (r = 
0.565, p<0.001) which is in keeping with the classical SID model. The data also 
suggest that oversight, in the form of a well-publicised probity exercise, was effective 
in changing practitioner behaviour regarding claims for surgical extractions.  
 
There is no evidence for induced demand for Endodontic treatment in the DTSS. 
 
Supplier Induced Demand has been described previously in situations where dentists 
and doctors have been paid by a third party. The data considered in this paper is 
consistent with such previous findings. It should be no surprise that dentists should 
behave as rational economic agents. The findings regarding Endodontics suggest that 
in clear-cut situations, dental ethics dominates economic incentivisation. However, 
many areas are less clear cut, as with the examples selected, and in such cases it 
behoves the designers of third party contracts to carefully crystallise their 
requirements in such a way as to avoid the ambiguity that might encourage Moral 
Hazard. The data also suggest the need for external clinical supervision in such third 
party arrangements. 
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Table 1: Tables.docx
Table 1: Contracted Dentist per 10,000 DTSS-Eligible Population, by Region and Year 
2002 – 2006. 
 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Eastern 12.3 12.0 12.5 13.6 12.2 
Midland 10.5 10.9 11.1 9.7 9.6 
Mid Western 9.7 9.7 10.0 10.1 10.5 
North Eastern 13.9 13.9 12.3 10.3 10.4 
North Western 7.8 6.1 6.1 6.5 6.1 
South Eastern 10.0 10.3 8.9 9.5 8.8 
Southern 15.9 15.8 16.9 17.5 17.1 
Western 8.3 10.1 10.6 12.0 12.5 
Notes: DTSS  - Dental Treatment Services Scheme, Ireland 
 
 
Table 2: Surgical Extractions as a percentage of all Extractions (%),  
 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Eastern 17.4 20.8 24.6 23.7 16.9 
Midland 10.8 14.5 15.7 14.4 11.8 
Mid Western 10.4 15.1 18.3 19.2 15.9 
North Eastern 10.2 14.4 14.5 15.5 15.2 
North Western 8.7 11.2 11.2 12.4 9.9 
South Eastern 10.6 13.7 17.2 16.2 14.7 
Southern 16.9 20.4 22.4 23.2 20.7 
Western 17.9 22.4 25.7 15.2 20.9 
 
Table 3: Mean Number of Claims for Endodontics per Dentist per Annum 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Eastern 2.71 3.30 3.03 2.68 2.85 
Midland 3.04 4.45 3.45 3.78 4.21 
Mid Western 5.27 5.78 5.44 5.55 5.31 
North Eastern 3.21 3.57 3.73 5.01 4.95 
North Western 5.84 8.28 8.07 8.00 7.86 
South Eastern 4.75 5.20 6.04 5.87 5.58 
Southern 3.65 3.55 3.18 3.08 2.72 
Western 5.68 5.50 4.80 4.10 3.99 
 
  
Table 4: Mean Number of Claims for Prolonged Periodontal Treatment per Dentist per 
Annum 
 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Eastern 15.80 21.48 21.61 20.35 18.16 
Midland 23.32 31.85 24.35 32.97 30.25 
Mid Western 21.67 30.24 32.03 34.28 35.93 
North Eastern 20.43 24.30 26.41 34.69 35.28 
North Western 14.37 21.33 19.27 20.16 23.13 
South Eastern 28.41 33.99 44.59 43.11 41.00 
Southern 25.09 19.92 18.11 18.49 18.31 
Western 47.30 47.05 47.62 50.76 49.66 
 
Table 5: Mean price per course of prolonged periodontal treatment (€), converted to 
Net Present Value in 2007  
 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Eastern 123.08 128.81 128.38 130.02 123.06 
Midland 116.87 119.26 125.38 121.79 119.64 
Mid Western 95.32 99.30 100.84 102.00 97.86 
North Eastern 105.87 111.15 119.32 118.87 112.89 
North Western 89.42 95.67 105.29 121.54 132.55 
South Eastern 126.79 126.89 130.80 130.87 125.76 
Southern 146.07 147.65 146.38 142.34 135.56 
Western 159.81 175.78 202.50 206.26 189.93 
 
Table 6: Claims for Extra Oral Radiographs per 100 Claims for Examinations 2002-2006. 
 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Eastern 14.8 14.7 11.6 9.8 9.5 
Midland 19.4 19.9 13.6 14.6 14.4 
Mid Western 8.5 11.7 13.0 14.1 15.1 
North Eastern 15.8 15.5 12.6 12.5 11.2 
North Western 3.9 5.3 4.2 3.9 4.0 
South Eastern 16.7 14.7 13.5 12.1 12.1 
Southern 19.7 14.2 11.9 12.3 11.8 
Western 12.2 13.2 10.6 10.7 11.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
